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I am happy enough to concede there were “bad guys” involved 
in our most recent experience of speculative mania and subse-
quent meltdown. There always are in such cases. Nor do I doubt 
there was plenty of “good guy” stupidity here too. There always 
is in such cases. What seems to me more interesting, however,
is how inessential these presences—which again always are with 
us, in good times and bad—are to explaining what happened. 
There’s no need to blame any market actor, or even any market, 
in accounting for what happened. The relevant story is else-
where. I think it will be useful to tell it. That will be fairer both 
to the innocents—the great majority, after all—and to the cause 
of our fi nding such cures as can prevent a recurrence.
So what is this “relevant story?” What we have just been through, 
I believe, is a classic asset price bubble and burst. And these 
bubbles and bursts, I shall argue, are best viewed as near text-
book cases of collective action problems. The hallmark of such 
problems is this: multiple acts even of ethically unobjectionable 
individual rationality aggregate into collectively irrational—even 
calamitous—outcomes. The wearisomely familiar “prisoner’s 
dilemma” that graces most game theory texts of course is the 
best known example—unless that be the likewise familiar
“tragedy of the commons.” But there are many others, some only 
marginally less familiar, worth recalling: arms races, bank runs, 
economy-wide layoffs, “liquidity traps,” recessionary spirals—
even consumer price infl ations, to name but a few.
It doesn’t seem widely appreciated that asset price bubbles and 
busts are of the same form—indeed, that they are effectively hyper-
infl ations. That is a pity. For once we see this, we no longer feel 
certain that there must be scoundrels or idiots behind every travail 
like that we’re now suffering. We become less inclined to cast 
blame. We turn instead to the search for constructive solutions.
Let us talk fi rst about asset price bubbles and bursts, then. After 
that I shall speak of solutions.
Asset price bubbles and bursts, along with the credit and mone-
tary contractions that characteristically follow them, recur with 
depressing regularity through the course of fi nancial history.1 
The same regularity characterizes the soul-searching and lesson-
seeking that seem always to follow these cataclysms.2 Given
the regularity both of these occurrences and of our subsequent
efforts to diagnose and treat them, one might have hoped we’d 
have reached “the end of [this] history” by now. Yet it seems we 
have not. Why?
One reason might be that each asset price bubble bears its own 
characteristic features. In particular, each bears its own underly-
ing asset or set of such assets, and its own species of fi nancial 
chicanery that seem always to come to light just as each bubble’s 
limits are neared.3 Hence it never is easy to predict the precise 
place the next bubble might begin to infl ate, or where fi nancial 
abuses are apt to occur. There is surely some truth in this hy-
pothesis. Financial regulators seem doomed often to plan for the 
last crisis much as generals are said to plan for the last war. Yet I 
doubt that this truth is the relevant truth we are after, for reasons 
I’ll presently explain.
Bubbles, Busts, and Blame
Ours are tough times for the image of bankers and other fi nancial professionals. The harms 
being suffered by many on “Main Street” are of obscure origin to most who inhabit that 
Arcadian precinct. Folk sense that “Wall Street” has something to do with their pain, but 
know little if anything more than that. Inexplicable pain of this sort seems quite often to 
issue in blame. There is a natural urge to know why one is suffering, after all; and when we 
can point to some devil or scapegoat in some such mysterious, alien locale as “the banks” 
or “the fi nancial district,” the pain grows apparently somewhat more bearable. It is not 
then the product of victims’—or public—incompetence. Yes, as seductive explanatory stories 
go, bad guy cupidity beats good guy stupidity hands down.
by  R O B E R T  H O C K E T T ,  P R O F E S S O R  O F  L A W ,  C O R N E L L  L A W  S C H O O L
14 |  FORUM  |  Spring 2011
Professor Whitehead
also takes on this topic 
on page 18.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805930
Another, more apposite reason for asset price bubbles’ regular 
recurrence might be our tendency, precisely by dint of our inclina-
tion to probe the unique characteristics of each new bubble and 
burst that occur, to overlook the invariant foundational structure 
that all asset price bubbles share. This tendency is especially
pronounced when infl uential lay and expert opinion alike—
including, conspicuously, regulatory opinion—harbor views of 
fi nancial markets that they erroneously take to be incompatible 
either with the existence or, by way of fallback position, with the 
pre-crash discernibility, of any such “foundational structure.”4
My own view, I have intimated, is that there is an invariant 
structure common to all asset price bubbles and bursts; that this 
structure is discernible even while bubbles are in the process
of infl ating; and that popular lay, professional, and regulatory 
opinion have lost sight of it owing to two misapprehensions. 
Those are that asset price bubbles and/or their detectability prior 
to bursts would be incompatible with (1) effi ciency on the part of 
fi nancial markets, and/or (2) rationality on the part of market 
actors. The effi ciency hypothesis in turn seems both theoretical-
ly warranted and empirically well corroborated; while systematic 
irrationality for its part seems wildly implausible, not to say
oxymoronic in the very naming. And so, the line of thought that 
I have in mind here concludes, it is the suggestion that bubbles 
are possible or detectable at all that must be rejected. Call these 
the “effi ciency-incompatibility” and “rationality-incompatibility” 
theses, respectively.
Why do I say “misapprehension” in connection with these two 
theses? Two reasons. First, because the kind of effi ciency that is 
in play when we speak of effi cient capital markets is primarily, at 
least in the short run, informational effi ciency, while only deriva-
tively—and in the longer run, with plenty of pitfalls along the 
way—allocative effi ciency. What the markets do effi ciently in the 
short run, in other words, is to impound price-relevant information. 
And the “information” in question here notoriously excludes 
potential value-relevant data that simply remains, for indefi nite 
periods of time, unavailable.
The information that capital markets effi ciently aggregate excludes, 
in other words, the stuff of radical “Knightian” or “Keynes 
Chapter 12” uncertainty. That is data in respect of which market 
participants must in effect take positions, but which positions
in turn have to be decided on the basis of generally serviceable 
conventions and heuristics, “best guesses,” “gut feelings,” or 
even “animal spirits” rather than plausibly assignable probability 
distributions. These are the kinds of decision that a still very few 
pathfi nders now seek to model through non-probabilistic “info-
gap” decision theory, rather than Bayesian models of the sort 
suited to actuarial “risk” as distinguished from uncertainty.5
And perhaps unsurprisingly, the jury will be out for a while on 
whether these new non-Bayesian models can handle Knightian 
uncertainty any better than do the old Bayesian stalwarts.
It also is important to understand informational effi ciency not 
only in respect of what it excludes, but likewise in respect of 
what it includes: that “information” notoriously includes, again 
at least in the short run, both (1) advertently and inadvertently 
propagated “misinformation” nicely suited to fi lling the gap that 
is Knightian uncertainty, and relatedly (2) “beautiful baby” and 
cognate forms of “noise” information. It includes, that is to say, 
information about how others are presently valuing the asset in 
question via their trading behavior, which itself can in turn be 
the product of how yet others appear to be presently valuing the 
asset in question via their trading behavior, and so on . . . etc.6 
Price movements prompted by trading on this sort of informa-
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All that is needed for the whole sorry “bipolar” process to 
get underway is for a comparatively small, critical mass
of best-at-the-time, yet nevertheless ill-founded-(only)-in-
retrospect, bets to be placed. A spontaneously emergent 
“pyramid” or Ponzi process, which requires no “scheme”
and no Ponzi, will then do the rest.
tion can, of course, readily become self-amplifying—the very 
antithesis of self-equilibrating.
Where efficient informational inclusion is concerned, in other 
words, positive feedback loops can amplify and distort, at least 
for several-year intervals, the more accurate “fundamental value” 
signals that informationally efficient market prices tend in the 
longer run to convey. Think of them as the positive flipside of 
those self-fulfillingly prophetic “runs” on assets that always 
follow on bubbles, the stuff of “busts.” For that is just what they 
are—they are “bank runs in reverse,” so to speak.7 All that is 
needed for the whole sorry “bipolar” process to get underway is 
for a comparatively small, critical mass of best-at-the-time, yet 
nevertheless ill-founded-(only)-in-retrospect, bets to be placed. 
A spontaneously emergent “pyramid” or Ponzi process, which 
requires no “scheme” and no Ponzi, will then do the rest.8 The 
oft-encountered quips of wags, pundits, and too many scholars to 
the contrary notwithstanding, little to none of this is in tension 
with the informational efficiency hypothesized by the Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis.9 
So much for the efficiency-incompatibility thesis. How about the 
putative rationality-incompatibility of asset price bubbles? Well, 
just as asset price bubbles are not incompatible with the relevant 
form of “efficiency” thought to characterize asset markets, nei-
ther are they with the relevant form of “rationality.” Once again, 
much popular parlance to the contrary notwithstanding, there is 
no tension between rationality on the part of individual financial 
market actors, on the one hand, and occasionally calamitous 
outcomes of interactions among multiple such actors on the other 
hand. To suppose that there is is to commit a fallacy of composi-
tion—to confuse a whole with the unstructured sum of its parts. 
It is also to overlook the commonplace, long familiar to game 
theory and folk wisdom alike, that multiple acts of individual 
rationality can under some circumstances aggregate into forms 
of collective irrationality.
Indeed, our recent bubble and burst in mortgage-backed securi-
ties and associated financial instruments, just like previous asset 
price bubbles, can readily be modeled as a variant of the familiar 
“prisoners’ dilemma” and “chicken” games regularly encountered 
in microeconomic and game theory texts.10 In particular, it can 
be viewed as the upshot of a stylized game of James Dean-style 
drag race “chicken.”11  
In my version of the game, justifiably self-confident, forward-wise 
blindfolded contestants drive speedily toward a cliff’s edge 
known to be far distant but not how far distant. They are paid by 
the foot to proceed for as long as—but only for as long as—they 
outpace others whom they can see to their sides and behind. 
Finally, they know there are multiple safety nets over the cliff’s 
edge in any case for at least some who don’t manage to “bail” 
in time to avoid going over. It is far from clear that there’s any 
irrationality on the part of any participant in this game. Each 
stands a good chance of bailing before going over, and of falling 
into a net if she does. And each stands to grow rich on the way.    
The blindfolds in my stylized game of course correspond to the 
radical uncertainty that attaches to any bubble’s limit point; even 
those who know we’re in bubble territory know that there’s 
generally no way to know when the party will end. Payment by 
the foot corresponds to the fact that all players grow richer the 
closer they draw to the endpoint, legging the spread between 
low borrowing costs and high capital gains rates. Finally, the 
nets of course correspond to the bailouts that many know they 
are apt to receive. No asset price bubble or bust over the past 
millennium fails to feature these characteristics.   
And it is precisely here, I suggest, that we find the “basic struc-
ture” to which I have referred—the structure that’s common to 
all asset price bubbles and bursts. When bubbles develop and 
inflate per this structure, all manner of behavior that ordinarily 
looks profligate or cavalier comes to look rather more prudent 
and prosaic. Purchasing a home or related asset with a low-
front-end, “balloon”-rate mortgage, for example, looks sensible; 
for throughout the bubble’s duration you can always cheaply 
refinance your loan on the strength of the rapidly appreciating 
collateral—the house or other asset—before the balloon rate 
kicks in. Lending to borrowers with less stellar credit histories 
looks safer for the same reason—the collateral’s continually rising 
price offsets the added default risk—so credit continues to flow, 
Once the limit point is reached, however, all turn 
abruptly and retrace their steps in reverse. The 
bubble deflates down the same path along which 
it inflated. The race back to the starting line 
artificially deflates asset values just as the race 
to the cliff’s edge artificially inflated them—even 
good assets are viewed as lemons.
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and debt rates continue to grow. Like remarks hold in respect of 
the good ratings that mortgage-backed instruments received 
for a while, and of the relaxed attitudes shown by some of our 
piecemeal—non-“systemic”—regulators like the SEC. For again, 
the hallmark of that collective action problem known as an asset 
price bubble just is that each actor’s actions are indeed rational, 
so long as all other actors remain able to keep acting as they have 
been acting. And it is only when indefinitely extensible credit’s 
never-precisely-foreseeable limit-point is reached that the latter 
proviso can no longer be counted on.  
Once the limit point is reached, however, all turn abruptly and 
retrace their steps in reverse. The bubble deflates down the same 
path along which it inflated. The race back to the starting line 
artificially deflates asset values just as the race to the cliff’s edge 
artificially inflated them—even good assets are viewed as lem-
ons. Previously boom-sustained debt now becomes “overhang,” 
no longer supported by highly market-valued collateral. Defaults 
ensue, first among borrowers, then among their lenders, then 
among lenders to lenders, and so on. Credit contracts system-
wide, just as mercurially as it formerly expanded. Business 
investment soon follows suit. Firms tighten belts, employees are 
laid off, consumer expenditures thus drop, firms accordingly 
contract further, and so on—as the boom’s feedback process 
morphs into the bust’s feedback process. Same collective action 
problem, now tacking south rather than north.
So there we have bubbles and busts and their structure. How 
about solutions?        
Solutions to collective action problems, unsurprisingly, require 
collective agents—agents who act in the name of all to render it 
no longer individually rational for non-collective actors to make 
decisions that aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes. In 
effect, that is how the Fed and Treasury behaved in the autumn 
of 2008 during the downside. TARP recouped most of its bailout 
moneys precisely because it brought into one portfolio securities 
that were undervalued by holders of multiple portfolios during 
the “downside” collective action problem that is a bust. But what 
about the “upside”—who serves as collective agent during a 
“boom” or a bubble?
That, I maintain, would be a macro-prudential, or “systemic risk,” 
regulator—an authority charged with overseeing and modulat-
ing price behavior in the credit-monetary-financial system as a 
whole rather than simply one sector of it. In particular, this reg-
ulator would monitor both (1) the growth of leverage rates across 
the economy as a whole and (2) the growth of spreads between 
market prices on the one hand and proxies for “fundamental” 
value on the other. As those rates and spreads moved into self-
amplifying territory, she would steadily tighten credit, increas-
ingly tax short term capital gains, or both. There are multiple 
levers by which this can be done—including Federal Funds rate 
management, open market operations, reserve requirements, 
capital regulation, deposit insurance charges, “Tobin” taxation, 
and others.12  But in order for it to be done, the regulator must of 
course understand her role as a collective agent—a desideratum 
that sits in some tension with devotion to, say, the ideology of 
Ayn Rand.13            
We had something much like the required collective agent over-
seeing the credit-monetary-financial system for a surprisingly 
lengthy, more or less bubble-free while: the Fed in the course of 
the 1950s, early-to-mid-1960s, and early-to-mid-1980s, when 
the likes of Chairmen William McChesney Martin and, later, 
Paul Volcker took seriously the Fed’s role as countercyclical mac-
roeconomic stabilizer.14 Both of those well regarded custodians 
of our credit-money system seem to have understood the sys-
temic prisoners’-dilemma-like structure of asset price bubbles 
and consumer price inflations alike.15 And so both employed the 
Fed’s principal systemic levers to “lean against the wind” and 
“take away the punch bowl just as the party was getting good” in 
order to stabilize asset and consumer price inflations.16 Volcker’s 
immediate successor, Chairman Greenspan, alas, saw things 
differently, succumbing by turns to the efficiency- and rationality-
incompatibility theses that I sought to dispel just above. Unless 
and until we fully reinstate the Fed’s—or some counterpart 
systemic regulator’s, such as the new Dodd-Frank-instituted 
Systemic Risk Council’s—role as envisaged by such former 
chairs as Martin and Volcker, I fear, we are probably destined to 
continue our cycle of repeated asset price bubbles and bursts, 
with all the lost wealth and lost health and “lost decades” that 
this always seems to entail.17  
We could pull that off partly by choosing our Fed chairs more 
wisely than we did from the late 1980s until recently. More 
securely, we would clarify the Fed’s mandate to make clear that 
overheated asset price inflation, as measured against suitable 
proxies for “fundamental value” (such as home building costs 
and rental rates in frothy housing market areas), is as inimical as 
is consumer price inflation to those “stable prices” that the Fed 
already is charged with  “promoting.”18 Ultimately, however, 
we’ll have also to bring more institutions and markets—notably 
hedge funds, money funds, repo and currency markets—under 
the credit-supervisory umbrella. For, unlike in Martin’s and 
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even in Volcker’s day, in our day it’s no longer commercial banks 
that are the principal sources of bubble-fueling credit. 
Whatever the means upon which we ultimately agree, the pri-
mary remedial end seems to me clear: close spreads between 
borrowing rates on the one hand, and bubble-sized asset price 
infl ation rates—as operationally distinguished from “funda-
mental” value appreciation rates—on the other. To do that
requires fi rst that we recognize bubbles’ and busts’ compatibility 
with informational effi ciency, market actor rationality, and,
indeed, even absence of blame.   
1. Pun on “depressing” foreseen but not intended. For histories of fi nancial crises and 
ensuing contractions, see, e.g., Charles Kindleberger’s classic, now in its 5th edition with a 
new coauthor, Charles P. Kindleberger & Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A 
History of Financial Crises (5th ed., 2005). Another recent treatment, this one a bit more 
teched-up with quantitative analyses, is Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This 
Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009). 
2. For two early—not to say diverting—examples, see, e.g., Joseph de la Vega, Confusión de 
Confusiones (Martin S. Fridson ed., 1996 [1688]), and Charles MacKay, Extraordinary Popular 
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Martin S. Fridson ed., 1996 [1841]). 
3. The chicanery, as it happens, seems seldom if ever to constitute a signifi cant cause of 
asset price bubbles or bursts, only a symptom that manifests late in the game. See Robert 
Hockett, “A Fixer-Upper for Finance,” 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1213 (2010).
4. Call the fi rst view the “ontic” view, and the second view the “epistemic” fallback. Former 
Fed Chairman Greenspan, for one, appears to have held each of these views at various 
points of his tenure.
5. Much more on this in Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3. On “Knightian” uncertainty, 
see of course Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, Profi t (1921). “Keynes Chapter 12” uncer-
tainty alludes to Chapter 12 of Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 
(1936) wherein also can be found the coining of the term “animal spirits” as employed in 
fi nancial market contexts. See also John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability 75–76, 
315 (1921); and Daniel Ellsberg, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” 75 Q. J. Econ. 
643 (1961). For more on non-Bayesian “info-gap” decision theory and its possible suitability 
to radically uncertain decision-making contexts, see, e.g., Yakov Ben-Heim, Info-Gap Decision 
Theory: Decisions Under Extreme Uncertainty (2d ed., 2006).
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6. “Beautiful baby” and “noise” information originate, respectively, with Keynes, supra note 5 
at 156, and Fischer Black, “Noise,” 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986). For more on all of this, see again 
Hockett, supra note 3.
7. See again Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for much more on this.
8. A fair bit has been written of late on positive feedback loops in asset pricing and their 
roles in bubble-infl ation. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al., “Beauty Contests and Iterated 
Expectations in Financial Markets,” 19 Rev. Fin. Stud. 719 (2006). A superb synthesis of his 
own many illuminating articles on the matter is Hyun Song Shin, Risk and Liquidity (2010).  
See also Hockett, supra note 3, and Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0 (working paper) for 
much more on the matter. The idea of a “naturally occurring Ponzi process” of course fi gures 
prominently in Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2000). 
9. See, of course, Eugene Fama, “Effi cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work,” 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). Also Eugene Fama, “Effi cient Markets: II,” 46 J. Fin. 1575 (1991).
10. See again Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3. See also my posting on the subject on 
the Dorf on Law weblog this past September, available at www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/09/
what-maynard-keynes-james-dean-and-now.html.
11. The typical game of “chicken” differs the generic “prisoners’ dilemma” game in one 
important respect: retaliation constitutes the best non-cooperative strategy in the latter 
case but not in the former, since retaliation in the former results in the death of both 
players. The variant of “chicken” that I model here, possessed as it is of “safety nets,” 
accordingly lies somewhere between garden variety “chicken” and “prisoners’ dilemma.”  
12. See again Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for detail. 
13. The allusion is to former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s devotion to Ms. Rand.
14. See again Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3 for more on this history. 
15. Consumer price infl ation is characterized by the same prisoners’ dilemma structure as 
characterizes asset price bubbles, which indeed can be viewed simply as cases of asset price 
hyperinfl ation. Again see Hockett, “Fixer-Upper,” supra note 3. 
16. The quoted nostrums were popularized by Martin. See id. 
17. With “lost decade,” I am alluding to the protracted slump, now rather more than a 
decade in duration, that Japan has suffered since the collapse of its stock and commercial 
real estate price bubbles of the late 1980s. With “lost health,” I am alluding to a recent report 
in the New York Times on the health consequences of long-term unemployment. Finally, 
with “lost wealth,” I am alluding to all of the production that is foregone during periods of 
capacity-underutilization, as during recessions.
18. See 12 USC 225a.   
…the primary remedial end seems to me clear: 
close spreads between borrowing rates on
the one hand, and bubble-sized asset price
inflation rates—as operationally distinguished 
from “fundamental” value appreciation rates—
on the other.
